Federal Power, Non-Federal Actors:  The Ramifications of Free Enterprise Fund by Krent, Harold J.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 79 Issue 6 Article 3 
November 2011 
Federal Power, Non-Federal Actors: The Ramifications of Free 
Enterprise Fund 
Harold J. Krent 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Harold J. Krent, Federal Power, Non-Federal Actors: The Ramifications of Free Enterprise Fund, 79 
Fordham L. Rev. 2425 (2011). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol79/iss6/3 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship 
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact 
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 2425 
FEDERAL POWER, NON-FEDERAL ACTORS:  
THE RAMIFICATIONS OF FREE ENTERPRISE 
FUND 
Harold J. Krent*
 
 
In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board1 the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Congress’s decision to protect 
members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
from at will removal by the Securities and Exchange Commission, whose 
members in turn are protected from at will removal at the hands of the 
President.2  The case arose out of Congress’s establishment of the Board as 
part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act3 to regulate accounting methods and 
procedures for publicly traded companies.4  Accounting firms must register 
with the Board and comply with its regulatory standards.5  In addition, the 
PCAOB conducts inspections of registered accounting firms, both on a 
regular basis and in response to allegations of noncompliance with its 
standards.6
In the Court’s view, the congressional structure—in particular, the double 
layer of tenure insulation—undermined the Article II imperative that all 
exercises of significant executive authority be subject to strong supervision 
by the President.  As the Court explained, “[t]he diffusion of power carries 
with it a diffusion of accountability. . . .  Without a clear and effective chain 
of command, the public cannot ‘determine on whom the blame or the 
punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures ought 
really to fall.’”
  Free Enterprise Fund is the first decision in almost a century to 
prohibit Congress from cushioning an executive branch official from 
removal, and the decision, as a consequence, will refuel debate over the 
scope and nature of independent agencies. 
7
 
*  Dean and Professor, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.  I would like to thank Jack 
Beermann and Donna Nagy for their helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Katherine 
Jahnke for her research assistance. 
  Given the departure from clear lines of authority, “[t]he 
result is a Board that is not accountable to the President, and a President 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 3164.  The Supreme Court so concluded on the basis of the parties’ stipulation. 
Id. at 3148–49; id. at 3182 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 4. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147–49. 
 5. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7212–7213 (2006). 
 6. Id. § 7214. 
 7. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155 (2010) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 
(Alexander Hamilton)). 
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who is not responsible for the Board.”8  The dissenters questioned why 
removal should be viewed as so central to the question of accountability 
under Article II, as opposed to other supervisory tools, such as rulemaking, 
funding, and the like.9  The dissent expressed concern for the fate of 
analogous agency structures that the majority decision placed in jeopardy, 
such as for administrative law judges shielded from at will dismissal at the 
hands of agency officials who themselves also are removable only for 
cause.10
Curiously, the dissenting opinion only tangentially considered the impact 
of the majority’s decision on delegations outside the executive branch.  The 
Court’s insistence in Free Enterprise Fund on formal presidential control 
over an inferior executive branch entity should cast grave doubt on the 
constitutionality of comparable congressional delegations to private entities.  
Should Congress delegate to a private or state entity, no removal is likely 
possible, let alone the removal for cause found insufficient in Free 
Enterprise Fund.  Had Congress delegated the same financial oversight 
duties scrutinized in Free Enterprise Fund to a commission comprised of 
the heads of Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, and Ernst & 
Young, the President’s removal authority would be further eroded, as would 
be the case if Congress had delegated that authority to a commission of 
state secretaries of the Treasury.  The recent Supreme Court decision 
therefore may toll congressional experimentation to vest executive authority 
in private and state hands. 
 
Ironically, Congress by its own terms created the PCAOB outside of the 
federal government.  Congress provided that members of the Board were 
not to be considered “officer[s] . . . or agent[s of] the Federal 
Government.”11  Moreover, Congress determined that the Board “shall not 
be an agency or establishment of the United States Government.”12  
Congress also determined that the salary of Board members should be set in 
accordance with the private market.13  Congress presumably wished to 
ensure that individuals with wide experience in public accounting could be 
persuaded to participate in the regulatory initiative.14
 
 8. Id. at 3153. 
  Had the Court taken 
Congress at its word, then its path in Free Enterprise Fund might have been 
much simpler.  The Court could have assessed whether Congress had the 
 9. Id. at 3179–80 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. app. A, at 3184–92. 
 10. Id. at 3180–81. 
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(b) (2006). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Donna M. Nagy, Is the PCAOB A “Heavily Controlled Component” of the 
SEC?:  An Essential Question in the Constitutional Controversy, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 361, 
372 (2010) (noting that PCAOB Board members’ “salaries are almost four times the amount 
received by the SEC’s Chairman and Commissioners, but are comparable to those 
commanded in the private sector.”); see also S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 7 (2002) (stating that 
competitive salaries for PCAOB staff members were essential to ensure that the “Board have 
a strong, well-trained, and experienced staff, of sufficient size to carry out its 
responsibilities”). 
 14. See Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Powers, Independent Agencies, and Financial 
Regulation:  The Case of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 485, 504–06 (2009). 
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power to delegate the accounting and inspection duties to an outside entity 
and thereby avoided its more controversial decision that the double layer of 
tenure insulation violated Article II.  The logic of the majority’s decision 
seemingly would have militated for invalidation on the ground that such 
significant authority could not, consistent with Article II, be vested in a 
private entity.15  Indeed, much of the early controversy surrounding the 
creation of the PCAOB focused on whether a private entity could discharge 
the regulatory role that Congress in fact assigned to the Board.16  The Court 
in part dismissed that line of inquiry only because it accepted the parties’ 
stipulations that the Board, despite Congress’s labeling to the contrary, 
should be considered a public entity.17
The Obama administration has seemed willing to share power with both 
private and state entities.  Congress, with the President’s acquiescence, has 
proposed that a private entity—the National Academy of Sciences—play a 
determinative role in setting global warming policy.
 
18  In addition, the 
administration agreed to a proposal creating a private Cybersecurity 
Advisory Panel that could have vetoed the Department of Commerce’s 
contract with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN).19  Moreover, the health care reform bill includes a delegation to 
a state entity, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC), to determine medical loss ratio standards which, to some extent, 
are binding on the Department of Health and Human Services.20
The Supreme Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund, therefore, 
provides renewed reason to consider whether congressional delegations 
outside the federal government pose the same threat to accountability as 
does delegation to the PCAOB.  In Part I, I argue that the reasoning in the 
recent Supreme Court decision should apply to delegations outside, as well 
  These 
initiatives have received scant attention. 
 
 15. With respect to the removal provision, Chief Justice Roberts confusingly observed 
that,  
The rigorous standard that must be met before a Board member may be removed was 
drawn from statutes concerning private organizations like the New York Stock 
Exchange.  While we need not decide the question here, a removal standard appropriate 
for limiting Government control over private bodies may be inappropriate for officers 
wielding the executive power of the United States.  
Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3158 (citation omitted).  Rather, the relevant question should 
be whether the individual to be removed is exercising significant authority under the laws of 
the United States. 
 16. See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law:  The PCAOB and 
Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 1000–03 (2005). 
 17. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148 (citing Brief for Petitioners,  Free Enter. Fund, 
130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861) 2009 WL 2247130, at *9 n.1; Brief for the U.S, Free Enter. 
Fund, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861) 2009 WL 3290435, at *29 n.8).  The Court also posited 
that congressional labeling was not dispositive, relying on its prior opinion in Lebron v. 
National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995). Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 
3148. 
 18. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey Bill), H.R. 
2454, 111th Cong. § 707. 
 19. S. 773, 111th Cong. § 8 (2010). 
 20. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2715, 124 Stat. 
119, 885–87 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-15). 
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as inside, the federal government.  I summarize reasons that I have 
previously presented for why delegations to private parties should be 
cabined.21
In Part II, however, I conclude that a similar delegation to a state entity 
should survive the Free Enterprise Fund analysis.  Although the same 
concern for executive branch control exists, our structure of federalism 
presupposes that the federal government can share power with the states.  
Even though lines of accountability can become blurred, as in the NAIC 
example, accountability nonetheless can be attained through the political 
process in the respective states.  Moreover, the fear of congressional 
aggrandizement is much reduced when Congress delegates to state as 
opposed to private entities.  Accordingly, this Essay concludes that Free 
Enterprise Fund should bar delegations of significant authority to private 
individuals and groups, but leave untouched most congressional efforts to 
share power with state governmental entities. 
  Free Enterprise Fund, in my view, strongly supports that view 
and suggests that the roles accorded to private entities in the Cybersecurity 
and National Academy of Sciences examples would be unconstitutional, 
admittedly despite prior Supreme Court precedents that seemingly 
countenance such delegations. 
I.  DELEGATION JURISPRUDENCE AND FREE ENTERPRISE FUND 
Congress at times has experimented by delegating a range of duties to 
private parties.  Indeed, Presidents largely have acquiesced in such 
delegations.  As with the congressional creation of the PCAOB, eliciting 
private party participation more directly can ensure greater expertise in 
governing and provide political cover for potentially unpopular regulatory 
initiatives. 
A.  Prior Judicial Precedents 
Although most delegations to private parties have gone unchallenged by 
litigants, courts have reviewed challenges to a number of congressional 
schemes.  The canonical case is Carter v. Carter Coal Co.22  There, the 
Supreme Court considered a statutory scheme in which a majority of 
miners, and the producers of two-thirds of the annual tonnage of coal, 
established working conditions that would bind the entire group.23  The 
maximum hours of work could be set, as well as the minimum wage.24  The 
Court explained that “[t]he effect, in respect to wages and hours, is to 
subject the dissentient minority . . . to the will of the stated majority.”25  In 
other words, “[t]he power conferred upon the majority is, in effect, the 
power to regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority.”26
 
 21. See Harold J. Krent, The Private Performing the Public:  Delimiting Delegation to 
Private Parties, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507 (2011). 
  The Court 
 22. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
 23. Id. at 310–11. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 311. 
 26. Id. 
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concluded that “[t]his is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; 
for it is not even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively 
disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and often are 
adverse to the interests of others in the same business.”27
In A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
  To the Court, the 
private status of the decisionmakers rendered the delegation more suspect. 
28 as well, the Court 
questioned Congress’s reliance on private parties to establish codes of fair 
competition under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).29  Under 
the Act, trade groups proposed codes of fair competition for ultimate 
approval by the President.30  The Court struck down those sections of the 
NIRA on both nondelegation and Commerce Clause grounds.31
In so doing, the Court noted the sweeping power exercised by private 
entities, even though the proposed codes were subject to presidential 
authorization.  The Court asked, “would it be seriously contended that 
Congress could delegate its legislative authority to trade or industrial 
associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem 
to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade 
or industries?”
 
32  Although acknowledging that Congress understandably 
might wish to delegate to private parties “because such associations or 
groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises,” the Court 
emphatically stated that “[s]uch a delegation of legislative power is 
unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional 
prerogatives and duties of Congress.”33
No delegation to private parties after Carter Coal and Schechter, 
however, has been invalidated.  Courts subsequently have upheld powers 
delegated to producer groups under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement 
Act of 1937
 
34 and similar statutes.35  In Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. 
Adkins36
 
 27. Id. 
 for example, the Supreme Court held that the advisory role private 
 28. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 29. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, invalidated by Schechter, 295 U.S. 495. 
 30. Schecter, 295 U.S. at 521–22. 
 31. Id. at 551.  Congress has delegated to private parties in numerous other contexts and 
these delegations have, on occasion, been more direct.  In 1893, Congress delegated 
authority to the American Railway Association to establish a mandatory height for drawbars 
on railroad cars, and legislated that failure to comply with the height requirement subjected 
all railroad companies to civil penalties. Act of Mar. 2, 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531.  The 
Supreme Court upheld the delegation with little discussion. See St. Louis, Iron Mountain & 
S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 285–87 (1908).  Further, private parties have served on 
governmental agencies such as the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which 
operates as part of the Federal Reserve System. See 12 U.S.C. § 263 (2006).  The private 
members are elected annually by the boards of directors of the twelve regional Federal 
Reserve Banks, which are privately owned. Id.  The FOMC as a whole discharges the critical 
policymaking function of determining sales and purchases of government securities in the 
open market. See id. 
 32. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 537. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.). 
 35. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2118 (2006) (cotton); id. §§ 2901–2911 (beef); id. 
§§ 4501–4514 (dairy). 
 36. 310 U.S. 381 (1940). 
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producers played in recommending coal prices did not constitute an 
unlawful delegation of executive power to private individuals because the 
private members “function[ed] subordinately to the [public] Commission.  
It, not the [private producers], determines the prices.”37  Evidence that the 
Commission rubberstamped the determinations made by private producers 
was not dispositive.38  In other words, the Court reasoned that private 
groups do not exercise problematic authority if the executive branch holds 
the formal power to approve whatever is forwarded by the private entity.  
Even though the private groups in effect make law, the required 
governmental approval makes the delegation acceptable.39
The Supreme Court manifested an even more lenient approach in 
Schweiker v. McClure.
  The Supreme 
Court has reasoned, therefore, that no untoward delegation of private 
authority exists if sufficient oversight can be exercised by federal 
governmental officials. 
40  There, the Court considered a Due Process 
challenge to private adjudication under the Medicare Part B program.41  
Under the Part B Program, Congress authorized the Secretary to contract 
with private insurance carriers to review and pay out deserving claims.42  
Carrier determinations are subject to a limited right of review by hearing 
officers who are also appointed by the carrier.43  As a practical matter, the 
decision of the private hearing officer is conclusive.  The lower court 
invalidated this system of private adjudication, reasoning that due process 
required additional procedural safeguards.44  Accordingly, it ordered de 
novo hearings before an administrative judge of the Social Security 
Administration.45
The Supreme Court, however, reversed, finding that, as long as the 
Secretary directs the carriers to appoint only “an attorney or other qualified 
individual with the ability to conduct formal hearings and with a general 
understanding of medical matters and terminology,” no risk of erroneous 
 
 
 37. Id. at 399; see also Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 86–87 (3d Cir. 1984); Chiglades 
Farm, Ltd. v. Butz, 485 F.2d 1125, 1133–34 (5th Cir. 1973); cf. Correctional Servs. Corp. v. 
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001) (refusing to extend a Bivens cause of action to private 
prison operator). 
 38. As Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo stated in concurrence in Schechter, “it is the 
imprimatur of the President that begets the quality of law,” not the plans forwarded for 
approval by the trade groups. 295 U.S. at 552 (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
 39. See Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 6 (1939) (designation of tobacco marketing 
areas); United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 577–78 (1939); H.P. 
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 307 U.S. 588, 595 (1939); United States v. Frame, 885 
F.2d 1119, 1125–29 (3d Cir. 1989) (beef program); United States v. MacMullen, 262 F.2d 
499, 500–01 (2d Cir. 1958) (wheat quotas). 
 40. 456 U.S. 188 (1982). 
 41. Id. at 192. 
 42. Id. at 190. 
 43. Id. at 191 (citing 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.807–.812 (1980)); see also Bowen v. Mich. Acad. 
of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986) (sketching the limited availability of judicial 
review under Part B). 
 44. Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 195. 
 45. Id. 
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deprivation existed.46  The fact that the hearing officers were private did not 
create any untoward risk of self-dealing, particularly because the funds used 
to satisfy the judgments came from the United States Treasury as opposed 
to the carriers (and hearing officers) themselves.47
Taken together, Sunshine Anthracite and Schweiker v. McClure suggest a 
wide ambit for the private exercise of delegated authority.  Private parties 
can exercise authority, backed by the coercive power of the state, as long as 
the authority is confined to a relatively narrow scope (as in Sunshine 
Anthracite and Schweiker) or is subject to review by executive branch 
officials (as in Sunshine Anthracite). 
 
Lower courts have so construed those precedents, permitting delegations 
to private entities for varied purposes.  In Cospito v. Heckler,48 for instance, 
the question raised was whether Congress could delegate to a private group, 
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH), the power to 
determine whether a hospital was eligible for Medicaid and Medicare 
reimbursement.49  The private group assessed the quality of care at health 
care institutions to determine eligibility for participation in the Medicare 
and Medicaid programs.50  One pertinent provision with respect to 
psychiatric hospitals provided that such hospitals could be certified “if such 
distinct part meets requirements equivalent to such [JCAH] accreditation 
requirements as determined by the Secretary.”51  The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit held that the Secretary’s power under the Acts to 
bypass determinations made by the JCAH salvaged the delegation.52  
Accordingly, “[s]ince, in effect, all actions of JCAH are subject to full 
review by a public official who is responsible and responsive to the political 
process, we find that there has been no real delegation of authority to 
JCAH.”53  Judge Edward R. Becker in dissent scoffed at the majority’s 
reasoning, stating that the JCAH at the relevant time “might ‘define’ a 
‘psychiatric hospital’ however it chose, and might use whatever procedures 
it wished in developing that definition . . . . and the JCAH regulations were 
not subject to judicial or administrative review . . . . The JCAH’s freedom 
to apply its regulations to individual hospitals was also unfettered.”54
 
 46. Id. at 199 (internal quotations omitted). 
  He 
concluded that “courts should not permit Congress to delegate to private 
bodies, that are not required by statute to listen to affected parties in making 
 47. Id. at 196. 
 48. 742 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 49. Id. at 74–75, 79; see also, e.g., City of Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 359–60 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (upholding delegation to determine whether particular cable operators could 
access video systems); Geo-Tech Reclamation Indus., Inc. v. Hamrick, 886 F.2d 662, 666 
(4th Cir. 1989) (upholding delegation to communities in effect to veto landfill permits if 
sufficient opposition were voiced). 
 50. Cospito, 742 F.2d at 75–77. 
 51. Id. at 76. 
 52. Id. at 88. 
 53. Id. at 89. 
 54. Id. at 90 (Becker, J., dissenting). 
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their regulations, and whose regulations are not subject to review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.”55
Similarly, in Todd & Co., Inc. v. SEC
 
56 the Third Circuit considered 
whether Congress’s delegation of authority to the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) constituted an unconstitutional delegation to a 
private entity.57  The Maloney Act authorized the self-regulatory entity to 
promulgate rules protecting against fraudulent and unethical practices, and 
to discipline members who failed to conform to the standards 
promulgated.58  Congress authorized the SEC to review the NASD’s 
findings upon appeal.59  A brokerage house contested an NASD 
investigation of its activities on the ground that the Maloney Act constituted 
an undue delegation to a private entity.60  The court rejected the challenge 
because the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) retained the power 
“to approve or disapprove the Association’s rules,” to make additional 
findings if necessary, and “make an independent decision on the violation 
and penalty.”61  Accordingly, the court found no impermissible exercise of 
authority by the self-regulatory entity.  Even when Congress eliminated the 
SEC’s right to make additional findings to add to the record, the court in a 
subsequent case similarly sustained the delegation to the self-regulatory 
entity.62
Based on cases prior to Free Enterprise Fund, the proposed delegations 
to the National Academy of Sciences and the Cybersecurity Panel would 
likely be upheld.
  Much as in Schweiker v. McClure, the court was not concerned, 
from an Article II vantage point, with the authority exercised by private 
decisionmakers. 
63
 
 55. Id. at 91. 
  In both cases, the ambit of authority delegated is 
narrow—in one case concerning only attainment of particular carbon 
emission standards and, in the other, the ICANN contract.  Moreover, 
executive branch officials must act in conjunction with the private parties in 
both cases before effecting national policy.  In the global warming setting, 
the President must issue a presidential order to cut emissions further and, 
with respect to cybersecurity, the Department of Commerce retains the 
power to re-craft any subsequent ICANN contract.  The private parties may 
shape or nudge executive branch action, but their acts do not replace it.  As 
the next part argues, however, Free Enterprise Fund destabilizes any such 
assumption. 
 56. 557 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 57. Id. at 1011–12. 
 58. Id. at 1012. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See First Jersey Secs. Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 697–700 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(following Todd, even though Congress had subsequently weakened SEC oversight of the 
NASD’s findings). 
 63. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Free Enterprise Fund and Article II 
From the perspective of the Free Enterprise Fund majority, delegations 
to private parties threaten the Constitution by circumventing the executive 
branch control that was designed to protect all individuals from 
governmental overreaching.  The President’s appointment and removal 
authorities are both implicated, for, as discussed in Free Enterprise Fund, 
they provide the “key constitutional means” for the President to retain 
control over authority delegated by Congress.64
1.  The Appointment Authority 
 
Although Free Enterprise Fund pinned its decision on the President’s 
removal authority under Article II, an understanding of the Appointments 
Clause, from which the removal authority is drawn, sets the stage for the 
Court’s reasoning.65  Under the Appointments Clause, Presidents enjoy the 
power to appoint all superior officers of the United States.66  Through the 
appointment power, Presidents can ensure that only officers they approve of 
are enforcing the law.  Article II provides that the President must appoint all 
superior officers, and that Congress can decide whether to vest appointment 
authority over inferior officers in the President, heads of departments, or 
courts of law.67  There have been disagreements over line drawing, 
particularly between superior and inferior officers,68 but consensus exists 
over the role that the Appointments Clause plays under the Constitution.  
The President’s choice of officer influences the exercise of delegated 
authority.69
In Buckley v. Valeo,
 
70 the Court chose “significant authority” as a 
threshold for triggering the Appointments Clause, and explained that the 
term encompassed “broad administrative powers:  rulemaking, advisory 
opinions, and determinations of eligibility for funds.”71  Although 
investigation and information gathering did not rise to the significant 
authority level,72 all individuals exercising more formal power to affect the 
rights of third parties must be considered officers of the United States and 
subject to Article II limitations.73
 
 64. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157 
(2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  In addition, all officers of the United 
 65. See Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting Appointments 
Clause issue that would arise from permitting federal government to delegate 
decisionmaking authority to states over pollution attainment policy).  
 66. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1997); Morrison v. Olson, 487 
U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988). 
 69. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118–41 (1976); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 
117, 163–64 (1926). 
 70. 424 U.S. 1. 
 71. Id. at 126, 140. 
 72. Id. at 137. 
 73. Id. at 138–43.  Individuals exercising authority that is only intermittent, however, 
may fall outside the Buckley rule. See Krent, supra note 21, at 536. 
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States must take an oath of office to uphold the Constitution.74  That oath 
signifies a more profound obligation to the public trust than a mere 
contractual duty.  For serious malfeasance in office, officers can be 
impeached.75
Congressional delegations of authority to private parties—whether to a 
producer group, single individual, or the National Academy of Sciences—
bypass the presidential appointment authority.  If Congress vested 
significant authority in the Cybersecurity Panel, the resulting execution of 
the law could not be as readily traced to the President, and his appointment 
authority would be circumvented.
 
76  As the Supreme Court stressed in 
Edmond v. United States,77 “the Appointments Clause . . . is more than a 
matter of ‘etiquette or protocol’; it is among the significant structural 
safeguards of the constitutional scheme.  By vesting the President with 
exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United 
States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional 
encroachment . . . .”78
Moreover, the Supreme Court has insisted that Congress play no direct 
role in the appointment of officers.  In Buckley, the Court considered a 
congressional measure empowering the Speaker of the House and the 
President Pro Tempore of the Senate to appoint four members of the newly 
created electoral commission under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971.
 
79  The Court held that Congress could neither participate in the 
appointment process directly nor indirectly, and noted that the “debates of 
the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with 
expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the National Government 
will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two branches.”80
 
 74. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
  
Respecting the President’s appointment authority was critical to ensuring 
that Congress would take no part in executing the law through appointing 
 75. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.  The Secretary of Treasury appointed Kenneth Feinberg, a 
New York attorney, to set the compensation that executives of entities receiving Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds can earn. See 74 Fed. Reg. 28,394 (June 15, 2009) (to 
be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 30); Eric Dash, The Walking Wounded, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 
2009, at B1.  Given that Feinberg issued binding orders affecting private rights, his status as 
an officer seems relatively clear, yet Congress did not lodge his appointment in the Secretary 
of Treasury as would be required under Article II to legitimate the appointment.  Thus, 
appointment of Feinberg can only comport with the Constitution if he is not considered an 
“officer of the United States.” See Michael W. McConnell, Op-Ed., The Pay Czar Is 
Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2009, at A25. 
 76. For those embracing a theory of directory authority, the lack of presidential 
appointment is not fatal.  Rather, if the President can order state officials to take particular 
positions or substitute state officials’ decisions for his own, or so the argument goes, then 
fidelity to Article II is maintained.  Not only do I challenge the existence of such directory 
authority, see Harold J. Krent, From a Unitary to a Unilateral Presidency, 88 B.U. L. REV. 
523 (2008), but any presidential bossing of state officials would almost surely violate the 
federalism principles built into the Tenth Amendment. See infra text accompanying notes 
148–54 
 77. 520 U.S. 651 (1997). 
 78. Id. at 659. 
 79. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 113. 
 80. Id. at 129. 
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officers.  If Congress retained close supervision of the private delegate, then 
Congress in essence would oversee execution of its own laws, a role that 
the Supreme Court has held would conflict with the Constitution.81
Similarly, in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for 
the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,
 
82 the Court considered whether 
Congress, in establishing a compact to oversee the administration of D.C. 
area airports, could subject major decisions of that compact to a board of 
review, consisting of nine members of Congress in their individual 
capacities as users of the airports.83  The Court held that the board of 
review, through its veto power, exercised significant authority pursuant to 
the laws of the United States and hence invalidated the continuing 
congressional role on the board.84  In the eyes of the Court, the board was 
“a blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative power.”85
At times, congressional delegation to private parties may permit the 
President to exercise the appointment power.  Consider Congress’s creation 
of the United States Railway Association to monitor the Consolidated Rail 
Corporation (CONRAIL) and issue bonds, among other duties.
  
Congressional delegation of power to private individuals outside the 
purview of the Appointments Clause cannot easily be reconciled with Free 
Enterprise Fund. 
86  In so 
doing, Congress provided that a majority of the Association’s members 
were to be drawn by the President from lists of private individuals supplied 
by the AFL-CIO and Association of American Railroads.87
2.  The Removal Authority 
  The vast 
majority of congressional delegations, however, whether to producer groups 
or the National Academy of Sciences, bypass the President’s appointment 
power. 
The Supreme Court also has recognized the President’s inherent right 
under Article II to remove any executive branch officer subject to his 
appointment power.  Although there has been much litigation over whether 
that removal authority should be plenary,88 the Court repeatedly has held 
that the removal power follows the appointment authority.89
 
 81. See infra text accompanying notes 106–14. 
  In Myers v. 
 82. 501 U.S. 252 (1991). 
 83. Id. at 255. 
 84. Id. at 277. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, § 210(a), 87 Stat. 
985, 1000 (1974). 
 87. Id. § 201(d), 87 Stat. at 988. 
 88. E.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 675–76 (1988) (questioning the adequacy of 
the President’s authority over the independent counsel); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 
723 (1986) (questioning the adequacy of the President’s removal authority over the 
Comptroller General). 
 89. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671; Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726; Weiner v. United States, 357 
U.S. 349, 353 (1985); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629–30 (1935); 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 126–27 (1926). 
2436 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
United States, the Supreme Court stated that “Article II grants the President 
the executive power of the Government, . . . the power of appointment and 
removal of executive officers—a conclusion confirmed by his obligation to 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”90  The President must be 
able to remove a superior officer “on the ground that the discretion 
regularly entrusted to that officer by statute has not been on the whole 
intelligently or wisely exercised.”91  Presidents cannot superintend the 
administration of laws effectively if they cannot, as a last resort, threaten to 
discharge officials, at least if the officers are neglectful of their duties.  
Again, in Morrison v. Olson, the Court stressed the importance of the 
removal provision in permitting the President “sufficient control over the 
independent counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform his 
constitutionally assigned duties.”92  Although the Court concluded in the 
case of the independent counsel that the removal authority need not be 
plenary, some form of removal authority was constitutionally required and, 
together with other control mechanisms, must ensure that the President 
retain sufficient control to exercise his constitutionally assigned duties.93
The Free Enterprise Fund decision reinforces the focus on hierarchical 
authority flowing from Article II:  the “executive power included a power to 
oversee executive officers through removal.”
 
94  To the Court, exercise of 
close removal authority was critical to ensuring presidential supervision 
under Article II.  Otherwise, the President’s “ability to execute the laws—
by holding his subordinates accountable for their conduct—is impaired.”95  
The fact that neither the President nor the SEC could remove members of 
the PCAOB at will, while members of the SEC were themselves protected 
from at will dismissal, was determinative.96  The Court concluded that, 
without sufficient removal authority, “the President could not be held fully 
accountable for discharging his own responsibilities.”97
Congressional delegations to private parties may deprive Presidents of 
the removal power.  If Congress lodges the power to set standards in a 
private group, for example, the President cannot remove members of that 
group from office.
 
98
 
 90. Myers, 272 U.S. at 163–64. 
  Congressional delegation to a private accounting 
group such as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) to set standards binding on the public would be problematic.  The 
private group could formulate binding standards, yet the members could not 
be removed even if the President disagreed with the standards selected.  
 91. Id. at 135. 
 92. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 658. 
 93. Id. at 695–96. 
 94. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3152 
(2010). 
 95. Id. at 3154. 
 96. See id. 
 97. Id. at 3164. 
 98. Contrast to Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), in which the President 
could remove Article III judges sitting on the Sentencing Commission from their 
administrative duties, although he could not affect their roles as judges. Id. at 411. 
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Moreover, under the global warming bill, the President could not remove 
members of the National Academy of Sciences even if he believed they 
engaged in misconduct.99  Similarly, if Congress designates a particular 
insurance company to resolve Medicare claims, the President would not be 
able to switch insurance companies if he determined that the company’s 
handling of claims was wasteful or inefficient.  Private parties largely are 
“immune from Presidential oversight, even as they exercise[] power in the 
people’s name.”100  As the Court summarized in Free Enterprise Fund, 
“[t]he diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of accountability.”101
On occasion, Congress may permit the President to remove a private 
individual from a multi-member commission as in the prior United States 
Railway Association example.
 
102
Of course, the President may wield substantial control even aside from 
the appointment and removal authorities.  Justice Breyer in dissent 
addressed the controls that can stem from funding, rulemaking, ex ante or 
ex post review of policies, and other mechanisms.
  But, the vast majority of such delegations 
seemingly confound the Free Enterprise Fund imperative that the President 
wield sufficiently direct removal authority over all entities exercising 
federal law. 
103  To the dissent, the 
question was whether, taken as a whole, the President exerted enough 
influence to assure that the essential attributes of the executive power 
remained vested in the executive.104  But, to the majority, the removal 
authority was talismanic—in the absence of such formal linkage, the 
President could not be assured effective oversight.105
In addition, although Congress may remove an individual in the 
executive branch from office by abolishing the entire office, it can effect  
removal of a private entity more directly merely by switching delegates.  A 
congressional threat to withdraw authority or funding from a private entity 
like the AICPA can influence behavior—the private officeholder may 
attempt to placate Congress to retain its power.
 
106  The Supreme Court 
categorically has determined that Congress itself can play no role in the 
removal of individuals exercising significant authority under the laws of the 
United States.107
 
 99. See supra note 
   
18 and accompanying text. 
 100. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154. 
 101. Id. at 3155. 
 102. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
 103. Id. at 3169 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. at 3169–73. 
 105. See id. at 3155 (majority opinion) (“By granting the Board executive power without 
the Executive’s oversight, this Act subverts the President’s ability to ensure that the laws are 
faithfully executed—as well as the public’s ability to pass judgment on his efforts.”). 
 106. If Congress eliminated the funding mechanism under which the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) currently operates, the private standard setting group 
could no longer function. 
 107. Justice Breyer in dissent stressed that congressional arrangements that can result in 
congressional aggrandizement of executive power are most likely to violate the separation of 
powers doctrine. Id. at 3167 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Bowsher v. Synar108 is illustrative.  In 
invalidating the Comptroller General’s role under the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act,109 the Court focused on the critical importance of the removal 
authority.110  Although the President appoints the Comptroller General to a 
fifteen-year term of office, Congress made the Comptroller General 
removable at the initiative of Congress for any one of several causes.111  
The Court held that “Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of 
removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws.”112  The 
Court explained that “once Congress makes its choice in enacting 
legislation, its participation ends.”113  Otherwise, Congress would both be 
able to exercise a de facto appointment and removal authority, permitting it 
to influence the exercise of delegated authority.  Indeed, in Myers the Court 
invalidated Congress’s participation in removal of the postmaster.114
Viewed through an Article II lens, congressional determinations to 
delegate significant authority outside the President’s control are suspect.  
The President’s Article II powers of appointment and removal are designed 
not merely to augment executive power, but to protect individual liberty.  
To ensure that public power is exercised in a responsible way, the President 
should stand formally accountable for the exercise of authority delegated by 
Congress.  Congressional delegations to trade groups and others can rob the 
President of his power to coordinate law implementation efforts and, at the 
same time, permit Congress too much influence in the execution of law. 
 
The question remains where to draw the line between impermissible and 
valid exercises of authority by private parties.  Eliciting advice from private 
parties does not violate Article II, but directing private parties to set trade 
policy would contravene presidential power.  The analysis in Free 
Enterprise Fund does not illuminate how to set the constitutional test.  The 
rulemaking, inspection, and enforcement duties of the PCAOB fell on the 
wrong side of the line because all parties recognized that, in the aggregate, 
the PCAOB exercised significant authority pursuant to the laws of the 
United States and could only be appointed and removed in conformance 
with Article II.  Although I have argued elsewhere that the doctrinal test for 
delegation to private parties should focus on whether the private party’s acts 
bind other private parties backed by the coercive power of the 
government,115
 
 108. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 the key here is that the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
makes it far more likely that congressional delegations of authority to 
private parties will elicit closer scrutiny by the Supreme Court should such 
challenges arise in the future.  Free Enterprise Fund may well have 
sounded the death knell for delegations of significant authority to private 
parties. 
 109. 2 U.S.C. §§ 901–07 (2006). 
 110. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727. 
 111. Id. at 720; id. at 785 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 112. Id. at 726 (majority opinion). 
 113. Id. at 733. 
 114. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926). 
 115. See generally Krent, supra note 21. 
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Indeed, the majority in Free Enterprise Fund might have bolstered its 
reasoning by pointing to the dearth of government-wide regulations 
applicable to the PCAOB.  Congress declared that the PCAOB should not 
be considered an “agency” and therefore it absolved the entity of the need 
to comply with the APA.116  Moreover, Congress specifically exempted the 
PCAOB unlike almost all other governmental entities from the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA).117
Consider as well the self-regulatory model that Congress rejected in 
creating the PCAOB.  Prior to enactment of the PCAOB, the SEC in effect 
delegated standard setting to the AICPA.
  Thus, in comparison to other agencies, fewer 
government-wide controls constrained the conduct of the entity’s work.  As 
a consequence, the argument for enhanced centralized control of the type 
advocated by the majority is more compelling.  In fashioning the PCAOB 
more like a private entity, Congress inadvertently strengthened the case for 
greater presidential control. 
118  After Free Enterprise Fund, 
such delegations to private entities are suspect—the President would not be 
able to oversee development of such standards through the threat of 
exercising the removal authority.119
Similarly, the Free Enterprise Fund case calls into question other 
congressional delegations to private parties.  Congress has authorized self-
regulatory organizations such as the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA) to investigate and prosecute violations of federal 
law.
  The President must be permitted the 
discretion to accept, reject, or modify the standards selected by private 
entities. 
120  Firms wishing to trade securities have no choice but to join a self-
regulatory organization.121  Firms and individuals disciplined, whether 
through fines or withdrawal of trading privileges, have a right of appeal to 
the SEC, but the SEC cannot add any findings to the record.122
 
 116. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2006) (limiting applicability of APA to agencies (i.e., 
authorities) of the United States). 
  There is 
 117. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(5)(A) (2006). 
 118. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law:  Copyright, 
Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291, 294 (2005).  In essence, 
Congress had delegated comparable authority to the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) 
through the middle of the twentieth century. Nagy, supra note 16, at 985–87.  Since 1973, 
the SEC has recognized the Financial Accounting Standards Board as the official entity 
setting standards for public company accounting. See Commission Statement of Policy 
Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, 
Securities Act Release No. 8221, 80 SEC Docket 139 (Apr. 25, 2003); Exchange Act 
Release No. 47,743, 80 SEC Docket 139 (Apr. 25, 2003); Accounting Series Release No. 
150, 3 SEC Docket 275 (Dec. 20, 1973).  Note that if Congress merely adopted preexisting 
AICPA standards, no constitutional problem would arise. 
 119. To be sure, there is a fine line between standard setting that represents the exercise 
of significant authority within the meaning of Buckley, and classifications that the 
government can contract out to private contractors to formulate. See Practice Mgmt. Info. 
Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997) (addressing Congress’s instruction to 
the Health Care Financing Administration to establish uniform code for assessing 
reimbursement for physician services), amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 120. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (2006). 
 121. Id. § 78o(b)(8). 
 122. Id. § 78s(e)(1), (f). 
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some disagreement as to whether the SEC’s standard of review of FINRA’s 
findings is de novo.123  Does FINRA, in investigating and then adjudicating 
violations of federal law, exercise significant authority pursuant to the 
statutes authorizing the self-regulatory mechanism?124  After Free 
Enterprise Fund, such delegations may be permissible only if the 
government can exercise exacting review before exchange determinations 
become final.125
Free Enterprise Fund teaches that delegation outside the federal 
government may undermine the President’s Article II obligation to 
superintend law enforcement by robbing him of his powers to appoint and 
remove from office those exercising significant authority pursuant to the 
laws of the United States.  How one defines the quantum of authority that 
only can be exercised subject to presidential direction becomes pivotal.  
Although the Court has yet to tackle that challenge, private entities such as 
the American Bar Association can evaluate nominees for office and offer 
advice
 
126
II. DELEGATIONS TO STATE ENTITIES 
 without transgressing the line, but permitting private entities to 
resolve federal claims without exacting review by a governmental agency 
would constitute the exercise of significant authority and therefore 
contravene the animating spirit of Free Enterprise Fund. 
Congress long has delegated to state as well as private entities.  Congress 
has approved state compacts to address issues of federal interest and 
specified goals to be accomplished.  Congress has also encouraged states to 
take responsibility to enforce federal standards such as those under the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).127  Moreover, Congress has 
authorized state officials to enforce a wide range of federal laws, most 
notoriously under the Fugitive Slave and Volstead Acts.128  Congress has 
also incorporated state law as federal policy, such as under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act,129
 
 123. Compare Whiteside & Co. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 7, 9 (5th Cir. 1989) (asserting that 
review of findings by the self regulatory organization is de novo), with Seaton v. SEC, 670 
F.2d 309, 311 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (utilizing preponderance of the evidence standard). But see 
MBH Commodity Advisors v. CFTC, 250 F.3d 1052, 1062–64 (7th Cir. 2001) (suggesting 
that each agency may construe statutory provision providing for review of self-regulatory 
organizations’ findings differently, depending on mission of agency). 
 which signifies that federal rules of decision automatically 
 124. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory 
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151 (2008). 
 125. Moreover, Free Enterprise Fund squarely places the status of the adjudicators in 
Schweiker v. McClure in doubt.  Those adjudicators resolved claims between private parties 
and the government without meaningful review by the Department of Health and Human 
Services. 
 126. See Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455–65 (1989). 
 127. See, e.g., Train v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975). 
 128. National Prohibition Act (Volstead Act), ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919); Fugitive Slave 
Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 302, 302. 
 129. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006) (“The United States shall be liable, respecting the 
provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a 
private individual under like circumstances . . . .”). 
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shift with changes in state law.  Finally, Congress has delegated specific 
enforcement tasks to state entities as in the NAIC example. 
Much of the analysis in Free Enterprise Fund logically should apply to 
the above contexts in which Congress delegates authority to state entities.  
Two key components of presidential control are absent.  The President 
likely neither appoints nor removes the state entity that is implementing or 
enforcing federal law.  In the health care reform statute, the President does 
not appoint state insurance commissioners, nor can he remove them from 
the NAIC.130  In addition, the President does not enjoy the power 
unilaterally to withdraw the delegation from the NAIC.  Congress therefore 
may leave execution of federal law outside the President’s control by dint 
of delegation to state entities.  Lines of accountability unquestionably can 
become muddled, as responsibility for the ultimate policy pursued is shared 
among Congress, which consented to the compact, the individual states that 
are in the compact, and the state officials who are acting to implement the 
policy selected.131
Nonetheless, I argue that delegations to state entities fundamentally differ 
from those to private entities for three principal reasons.  First, the 
Constitution anticipates congressional sharing of power with state far more 
than private entities.  Second, state officials are more accountable to the 
electorate—whether directly or indirectly—than are private entities.  Third, 
there is far less danger of congressional aggrandizement in the context of 
delegation to state entities. 
 
Delegations to state entities, however, should not be immune from 
Article II analysis of the type articulated in Free Enterprise Fund.  In the 
final section, I examine two contexts in which delegations to state entities 
raise distinctive constitutional problems:  first, when the delegation 
impinges on a presidential power separate from this “take care” authority, 
such as in foreign relations; and second, when Congress delegates to 
favored states the power to impose costs on others.  I tentatively conclude 
that judicial review is relatively cost free in the first setting and that limits 
on delegation accordingly should be enforced, but that judicial review is not 
worth the costs in the second.  Thus, although a particular delegation to a 
state entity might violate the Constitution, the Free Enterprise Fund 
analysis should not apply as strictly as in the private delegate context.  As a 
consequence, the delegation to the NAIC likely comports with the 
constitutional structure. 
 
 130. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 131. If the President could supervise state entities’ and officials’ exercise of delegated 
authority, the constitutional problem would recede, and so Professor Steven G. Calabresi has 
argued. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute 
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).  It is difficult to conceive, however, how Presidents 
could oversee or alter implementation efforts by state officials and entities.  Indeed, the 
prospect that Presidents could reverse decisions made by state officials would turn 
federalism principles on their head. See also supra note 76. 
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A.  The Case for Upholding Delegation to State Entities 
As with delegations generally, Congress may have myriad reasons to 
recruit state entities to help implement federal law.  Congress, for example, 
may wish to elicit the expertise of officials in state government.  The NAIC 
example illustrates this rationale—state insurance commissioners 
presumably have greater familiarity and experience with medical loss ratios 
than does the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).132  
Similarly, delegations to states to fashion rules to implement federal 
mandates under the EPA reflect efforts to enlist the help of officials with 
more immediate knowledge of the conditions affecting each respective 
state.133
Delegations to state entities also can ensure that those closest to the 
dispute have a more direct say in governance.  Cases involving boundary 
disputes among the states provide a clear example, as do the compacts 
among states operating port authorities or other transportation hubs.  States 
may find congressional delegation more palatable when they can participate 
in shaping the rules that affect them so directly.  Similarly, in the Free 
Enterprise Fund case, Justice Breyer in dissent cited the delegation to the 
Delta Regional Authority.
 
134
Some delegations to state entities facilitate efficient implementation of 
the laws.  State officials should be able to detect some federal law 
violations with less expense than federal enforcement officials.  State 
officials investigating state crimes may well learn of conduct that gives rise 
to federal law violations.  And, by predicating the Federal Tort Claims Act 
on state law, Congress need not fashion independent standards of care and 
rules of recovery.  State legislatures and courts have been setting standards 
of care for generations. 
  By dint of that delegation, states within the 
lower Mississippi delta region make the development decisions critical to 
their future economic growth. 
Finally, some congressional delegations to state entities presumably stem 
from congressional reluctance to discharge the responsibilities.  Law 
enforcement under the Fugitive Slave Act provides one example, as may 
congressional delegations of the power to run D.C. area airports or to 
determine where low level radioactive waste should be stored.135
 
 132. See supra note 
  As with 
delegations more generally, Congress may wish to duck responsibility for 
tough political choices.  In all, Congress has many understandable reasons 
for delegating authority to state entities and officials. 
20 and accompanying text. 
 133. See, e.g., Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975). 
 134. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3168 
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2009aa-1 (2006)). 
 135. See, e.g., EnergySolutions, LLC v. Utah, 625 F.3d 1261, 1265–68 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(discussing Congress’s delegation of low-level radioactive waste disposal policy to the 
states). 
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1.  The Constitutional Plan 
To some degree the constitutional system of federalism contemplates 
such congressional sharing of power with state entities.  Article I provides 
that Congress can consent to state decisions to levy “duty of Tonnage, keep 
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, [or] enter into [an] Agreement or 
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power.”136  The Compact 
Clause has been utilized frequently, and Congress long has delegated to 
groups of states the power to regulate over subjects such as 
transportation,137 energy,138 and tax matters.139  The resulting rules of the 
compacts are to be treated as federal law,140 even if the interstate 
commissions are not considered federal agencies.141  The fact that the 
Founders authorized Congress to consent to state compacts whose authority 
could reach issues of national or regional import strongly calls into question 
the view that congressional delegation of authority to state entities should 
be categorically prohibited.142
Moreover, Congress since the Founding has recruited state officials to 
help enforce federal laws.  Congress has authorized state officials to arrest 
and punish individuals for violation of federal laws.
 
143  As the Supreme 
Court summarized in United States v. Jones,144 “from the time of its 
establishment [the federal] government has been in the habit of using, with 
the consent of the States, their officers, tribunals, and institutions as 
agents.”145  The Court noted that “[t]heir use has not been deemed violative 
of any principle or as in any manner derogating from the sovereign 
authority of the federal government.”146  Thus, the Constitution 
contemplates far more exercise of executive authority by states than by 
private entities.147
To be sure, the Supreme Court has counseled that Congress cannot 
compel state entities to enforce or implement federal law.  For example, in 
New York v. United States
 
148
 
 136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 the state challenged Congress’s requirement 
 137. See, e.g., Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft 
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 255 (1991). 
 138. See, e.g., Seattle Master Builders Assoc. v. Pac. Nw. Elec. Power & Conservation 
Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 139. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 459–72 (1978). 
 140. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981). 
 141. New York v. Atl. States Marine Fisheries Comm’n, 609 F.3d 524, 531 (2d Cir. 
2010). 
 142. Similarly, there is no constitutional impediment to incorporating evolving state law 
as the governing rule of decision, as in the FTCA example. 
 143. Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive:  Congressional Delegations of 
Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV 62, 80–84 
(1990). 
 144. 109 U.S. 513 (1883) (upholding statute authorizing states to determine compensation 
in takings cases). 
 145. Id. at 519. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 411–12 (1999) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part). 
 148. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
2444 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act that states take 
ownership of all internally generated waste upon the request of the waste’s 
generator.149  This regulation arose out of Congress’s effort to provide an 
incentive to ensure sufficient disposal sites for low level radioactive waste.  
The Court summarized that “Congress may not simply commandeer the 
legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and 
enforce a federal regulatory program.”150  Furthermore, “[w]e have always 
understood that even where Congress has the authority under the 
Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the 
power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”151
The Court justified its conclusions in part on the ground that, “where the 
Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both 
state and federal officials is diminished.”
 
152  State officials might bear the 
political ill will from following Congress’s policy even though it was 
Congress that devised the law.  The Court elaborated upon this rationale in 
Printz v. United States.153  There, the question for resolution concerned 
whether Congress could force state officials to conduct background checks 
on those seeking to buy handguns.  The Court stressed that, to individuals 
purchasing handguns, the regulations would appear to come from the state 
officials implementing the congressional plan as opposed to Congress.154
The Court’s commandeering doctrine, however, permits states and state 
officials voluntarily to implement federal law.  When state officials decide 
on their own to conduct background checks or to take title to waste sites, 
they remain accountable, at least in part, for their acts within our federalist 
scheme.  Even if Congress has set the policy framework, state 
implementation efforts, as long as voluntary, do not fully obfuscate lines of 
authority. 
  
As a result, the goal of accountability was undermined. 
State exercise of delegated federal authority undoubtedly strains the 
structure of our constitutional system as conventionally understood.  
Indeed, Justice Scalia recognized that cost in Printz, noting that widespread 
delegations by Congress to state officials would permit such officials “to 
implement the program without meaningful Presidential control (if indeed 
meaningful Presidential control is possible without the power to appoint 
and remove).”155  He continued more forcefully that the unified executive 
branch enforcement “would be shattered, and the power of the President 
would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively without 
the President as with him, by simply requiring state officers to execute its 
laws.”156
 
 149. Id. at 149, 153 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (2006)). 
 
 150. Id. at 161 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 151. Id. at 166. 
 152. Id. at 168. 
 153. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 154. Id. at 930. 
 155. Id. at 922. 
 156. Id. at 923. 
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Yet, the impact on Article II should be the same whether state officials 
implement federal law on command or license from Congress—the 
President’s appointment and removal powers would be circumvented in 
either case.  Justice Scalia noted the problem and could only offer that “the 
condition of voluntary state participation significantly reduces the ability of 
Congress to use this device as a means of reducing the power of the 
Presidency.”157
2.  Political Accountability 
  Delegation to state entities can be reconciled only by dint 
of the overriding role of states in the plan of convention.  The Founders 
anticipated that state entities could play a meaningful role in execution of 
federal law.  Delegation to state entities may be upheld even where they 
would be invalidated if directed toward private entities. 
In contrast to private entities, state officials are politically accountable.  
They remain subject to the checks and balances in the respective states and 
can be held to account by the electorate, or at least by their superiors within 
the state government.  Should state insurance commissioners adopt medical 
loss ratio standards that are unreasonable, they can be chastened by state 
chief executives, and if the sheriffs harass citizens over gun registration, 
they may see repercussions at the ballot box.  Particularly if state officials’ 
exercise of delegated authority focuses on citizens within their states, 
political checks within those states seem adequate to constrain their 
authority.  Moreover, under Article VI of the Constitution, state 
legislators—unlike private parties—must take an oath of office to support 
the Constitution.158
Consider the delegation to the Delta Regional Authority
 
159 cited by 
Justice Breyer in his Free Enterprise Fund dissent.160  The Authority, 
which is funded equally by the Federal Government and the states, is 
composed of a federal member and “the Governor (or a designee of the 
Governor) of each State in the region that elects to participate in the 
Authority.”161  The Authority approves project and grant proposals “for the 
economic development of the region.”162
 
 157. Id. at 923 n.12.  The dissent noted the weakness in Justice Scalia’s argument as well. 
Id. at 960 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
  Although the Authority plainly 
exercises significant power in approving projects for economic 
development of the region, political accountability is not lost.  Participating 
Governors can tout accomplishments of the Authority and burnish their 
records, and failures to husband resources wisely may well impair chances 
at the next election.  The “public” nature of the exercise of authority 
provides some support for implementation of federal tasks by state entities. 
 158. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 159. 7 U.S.C. § 2009aa-1 (2006). 
 160. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3168 
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 161. 7 U.S.C. § 2009aa-1(a)(2). 
 162. Id. § 2009aa-1(d)(1). 
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3.  Potential for Congressional Aggrandizement 
The Supreme Court has weighed the potential for aggrandizement 
heavily in resolving separation of powers disputes.  There is less danger of 
congressional aggrandizement when Congress delegates to states as 
opposed to private entities.  A delegation to a state is much less in the 
nature of an appointment—state officials are less likely to feel beholden to 
Congress than would private individuals similarly selected.  State officials 
do not likely stand to gain salary or status from exercising delegated 
responsibilities.  They seldom would endeavor to placate congressional 
views in order to retain their jobs—after all, they owe their authority 
principally to the state, not the federal government. 
  In contrast, consider congressional delegation to an insurance company 
that Congress has designated to handle Medicaid claims.  The insurance 
company recognizes that, should its claim resolution displease Congress—
whether for reasons of inefficiency or error rates—Congress may well 
withdraw the delegation.  The insurance company might be dependent on 
congressional funding for its corporate livelihood.  Indeed, self-regulatory 
organizations recognize that Congress may impose greater centralized 
control over the private sector should it be displeased with the lack of fervor 
of its regulatory initiatives as happened with the AICPA.163
Indeed, one of the most critical protections against undue delegation to 
administrative agencies by Congress in general is that Congress must be 
willing to give up the reins of power.  Congressional delegation, in other 
words, comes with a price—the loss of control over the shape of the final 
policy implemented.  That check on congressional delegations, while absent 
for many delegations to private entities, exists when Congress delegates to 
state entities. 
  In contrast, 
congressional delegation to state entities carries with it much less risk of 
continuing oversight or aggrandizement. 
The constitutional recognition for federalism, the comparable 
accountability of state as opposed to private officials, and the limited 
potential for aggrandizement combine to strengthen the case for permitting 
Congress to delegate particular functions to state entities.  State officials 
can enforce federal law, as with the Brady Bill, without violating the 
constitutional structure.  Similarly, they can in effect make federal law as 
part of a compact consistent with Article II.  Our system of federalism 
presupposes some limitation on presidential control over authority 
delegated from Congress to state entities. 
 
 163. A similar example is the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), 
formed in the mid-1980s by industry members trading in swaps and derivatives. See Sean M. 
Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade Association:  Group Interactions Within the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 211, 234–38 (2001).  The 
ISDA lobbied to keep the industry self-regulated. Id. at 245–46.  However, presumably 
because of the role that swaps played in the market blow up and the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and AIG in 2008, swaps are now regulated by the SEC and CFTC under the Dodd-
Frank Act. Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 701–74, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641–802 (2010). 
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B.  Limitations on Delegation to State Entities 
At the same time, delegations to state entities should not be immune from 
separation of powers scrutiny.  Without teasing out an elaborate theory, let 
me suggest two contexts in which Article II concerns arguably trump those 
of federalism:  first, when Congress delegates authority that diminishes 
another of the President’s authorities explicit or implied under Article II, 
such as the foreign affairs power; second, and more tentatively, when state 
entities’ exercise of authority permits one block of states to foist costs on 
states disfavored by the congressional majority. 
1.  Independent Article II Powers 
Congressional delegation to state entities may, at times, rob the President 
of an Article II power other than law enforcement.  Although the 
constitutional design and history suggest that the President must share some 
enforcement authority with state entities and officials, the President should 
not necessarily brook Congress’s delegation of other constitutionally 
grounded powers.  For instance, congressional delegation to the NAIC of 
the power to appoint the head of Medicare would plainly contravene the 
Appointment power in Article II.  Similarly, congressional delegation of the 
pardon power164
Moreover, consider a hypothetical congressional delegation to a state 
compact comprising the border states of the authority to enter into trade 
agreements with Latin America.  Tariff and trade policy might thereby be 
executed outside the watch of the President.  A few states together, upon 
delegation from Congress, would have the power to bind the entire country 
in setting relations abroad.  Needless to say, the interests of respective states 
in terms of international relations vary.  Indeed, Congress approved a 
provision in the Great Lakes Basin Compact establishing that “the Province 
of Ontario and the Province of Quebec, or either of them, may become 
states party to this compact by taking such action as their laws and the laws 
of the Government of Canada may prescribe for adherence thereto.”
  to a state entity would be invalid. 
165
The Constitution recognizes the potential conflict, but only in part.  
Article I itself forbids states from “enter[ing] into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation; [or] grant[ing] Letters of Marque and Reprisal.”
  
Congress empowered the compact to pursue measures with a palpable 
impact on foreign affairs. 
166  That 
prohibition suggests a constitutional awareness that Article II at times 
trumps federalism.  But, Article I does not limit congressionally approved 
compacts that do not fall within the category of “Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation,” even those with foreign states.167
 
 164. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
  The line between 
 165. Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419, art. II(B), 82 Stat. 414, 414 (1968); 
see MARIAN E. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS:  A QUESTION OF FEDERALISM 156–57 
(1971). 
 166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 167. Id. 
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“Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation” and compacts with foreign states is not 
self-evident, and the Supreme Court has stated that any such distinction in 
the minds of the Framers has been lost to history.168
Although a congressional stamp of approval can authorize states to 
execute the law, Congress cannot resort to delegation to state entities to 
strip the President of his role in foreign affairs.
  Article II must be 
accommodated with Article I in some fashion. 
169
Indeed, comparable concerns have led the Supreme Court to strike down 
state laws that have interfered with the United States’ foreign policy.  In 
Zschernig v. Miller,
  The Constitution may 
not sort out the overlap between federalism and separation of powers 
concerns, but it plants the seeds for an accommodation. 
170 for example, Oregon law had prohibited any non-
U.S. citizen from inheriting property if his or her home nation denied U.S. 
citizens that right.171  After losing in Oregon’s courts, an East German 
citizen successfully sought review in the Supreme Court, which reversed 
the Oregon decision on the ground that the state statute impermissibly 
intruded into the President’s foreign affairs power.172  For another example, 
Massachusetts in 1996 established a restrictive purchasing list targeting 
companies doing business with Burma (now named Myanmar) to protest 
the dictatorship’s policies.173  That action placed the United States in the 
awkward position of defending the Massachusetts approach before the 
World Trade Organization while attempting behind the scenes to pressure 
Massachusetts to change the law.174  Firms doing business in Burma 
challenged the law, and the courts invalidated the measure.  The Supreme 
Court in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council175 stressed in reviewing 
the Massachusetts measure that the state’s action interfered with subsequent 
congressional delegation of authority to the President to impose sanctions 
on Burma.176
In the above examples, Congress did not sanction the state interference in 
foreign affairs.  Congressional approval of such state actions, however, 
nonetheless might intrude into the President’s constitutionally grounded 
authority to superintend relations with foreign states.  Perhaps 
congressional authorization can alter the boundaries in which states are free 
 
 
 168. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 460–72 (1978) 
(distinguishing between alliances and other agreements lost in history). 
 169. Cf. Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249 (1833) 
(commenting that states cannot enter into any agreements with foreign powers). 
 170. 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
 171. Id. at 430–31 & n.1. 
 172. Id. at 436 (“[S]tate involvement in foreign affairs and international relations [are] 
matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government . . . .”). 
 173. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366–68 (2000). 
 174. See id. at 383–84. 
 175. 530 U.S. 363. 
 176. Id. at 374–77; see also Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413–29 (2003) 
(striking down California’s facilitation of Holocaust era insurance claims); Von Saher v. 
Norton Simon Museum, 592 F.3d 954, 968 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that California cannot 
extend the statute of limitations for recovering art stolen during the Holocaust). 
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to act, but congressional delegation can no more vest in states the power to 
initiate hostilities abroad than it can authorize states to enter into treaties. 
Consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Holmes v. Jennison.177  The 
Supreme Court confronted the question of whether Vermont could agree 
with Canadian authorities to extradite fugitives in the absence of 
congressional sanction.  A majority of the eight Justices participating 
evidently concurred in Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s reasoning that the 
extradition agreement was illegal, but could be rectified by congressional 
consent.178
2.  Delegations Permitting Discrimination Against Nonparticipating States 
  The Court ignored the potential separation of powers 
ramifications of Vermont’s unilateral determination to enter into an 
extradition agreement with a sovereign nation.  In light of the President’s 
constitutionally grounded powers over foreign relations—the power to 
propose treaties, appoint ambassadors, and be commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces—the Holmes Court should have struck down Vermont’s 
arrangement on Article II grounds as well.  Congress cannot enlist 
particular states to forge foreign policy.  As Zschernig and Crosby 
demonstrate in the related context sketched above, there will be line 
drawing issues, but state delegations should be judicially policed to ensure 
that the delegations do not permit intrusion into the President’s powers 
other than in law enforcement.  The historic understanding of shared power 
between states and the federal government does not extend that far.  Free 
Enterprise Fund suggests that delegation to state entities should be 
scrutinized at least to determine whether the President exercises sufficient 
control over foreign affairs. 
Arguably, Congress should also be limited in delegating to state entities 
when the delegation permits states to infringe the interests of states that 
have been excluded from the delegation.179  Although delegations to a wide 
swath of state officials as in the NAIC example would not be problematic, 
delegations to a compact of states could harm nonparticipating states.  As a 
theoretical matter, the President’s Article II powers are designed in part to 
ensure accountability for a national constituency.  As the Court in Free 
Enterprise Fund framed it, the “Constitution requires that a President 
chosen by the entire Nation oversee the execution of the laws.”180
 
 177. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840). 
  If 
congressional delegations to state entities result in injury to nonparticipating 
states, then bypassing the President causes an independent harm in 
precluding the check of presidential oversight—oversight from the only 
 178. Id. at 570 (“The power of deciding whether a fugitive from a foreign nation should 
or should not be surrendered . . . is one of the powers that the states are forbidden to exercise 
without the consent of Congress.”). 
 179. In essence, the concern is that the political safeguards of federalism do not protect 
the interests of states that cannot exert sufficient influence in Congress as a whole. 
 180. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155–56 
(2010). 
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politically elected official beholden to a national constituency.181  As 
Professor Calabresi expresses the presidential advantage in a slightly 
different context, “[t]he only official with any incentive under our present 
electoral structure to stop this [effort to impose costs on others] is the 
President who is (along with the Vice President) our only nationally elected 
official.”182  Similar sentiments support presidential line item vetoes—only 
the President arguably has the national perspective to stop earmarks that 
redound to the benefit only of particular sectors of the country.183
The Supreme Court on occasion has stated that the congressional consent 
requirement in the Compact Clause was designed in part to prevent 
participating states from shifting costs or harms to nonparticipating ones.  
Compacts must be submitted for congressional approval in part to guard 
against, in Justice Byron White’s words in United States Steel Corp. v. 
Multistate Tax Commission, “encroachments upon non-compact States.”
 
184  
Consider congressional delegation to a compact of states to regulate 
production of coal in the Northeastern states.  In making its determination, 
the compact might be tempted to shift costs of externalities such as 
pollution to states in the Midwest.185  Similarly, states may urge Congress 
to set up conditional funding programs that they know other states cannot 
take advantage of.186  In U.S. Steel itself, plaintiffs challenging the compact 
argued that the states participating in the compact might agree to particular 
tax formulas to draw businesses from nonparticipating states.187
The continuing litigation over disposal of low level radioactive waste 
manifests the risk of state v. state friction.  Congress authorized compacts to 
encourage states to determine among themselves which states would create 
and maintain waste sites, and how other members of the compact would 
furnish sufficient incentives to the state in which the site is located.  The 
 
 
 181. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 
ARK. L. REV. 23, 65–66 (1995).  Calabresi argues in part that the unitary executive is 
designed to prevent members of Congress from legislating purely to benefit particular 
geographic sectors.  For a response, see Evan Caminker, The Unitary Executive and State 
Administration of Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1075, 1110 (1997), doubting that such 
concerns should lead to curbing delegations to state officials, as long as only citizens within 
the states are affected. 
 182. Calabresi, supra note 181, at 35. 
 183. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, The Petty Larceny of the Police Power, 86 CALIF. L. 
REV. 655 (1998) (reviewing FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING:  POLITICIANS, RENT 
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997)); Aaron D. Zibart, Note, Eulogizing the Line 
Item Veto Act:  Clinton v. City of New York and the Wisdom of Presidential Legislating, 88 
KY. L.J. 505 (2000). 
 184. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 494 (1978); see also 
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 726 (1838). 
 185. Cf. West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 30–31 (1951) (rejecting 
challenge to compact addressing discharge into Ohio River).  See also the discussion in 
Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1997), addressing the difficulty of confining 
impact of pollution to states within a single compact or alliance. 
 186. See Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 963 (2001). 
 187. U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473. 
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states involved in the compact have little interest in permitting waste 
generated outside the compact to be stored in their sites.188
At times, consumer interests within the states may restrain state efforts to 
impose costs on businesses outside the state because of the concern for 
price increases.  The compact, however, may override such objections, 
particularly if the states can ensure that much of the costs of any 
development flow downstream.  
 
In such cases, the congressional consent requirement might be 
insufficient to prevent encroachment on interests of states outside the 
compact.  Although the prospect of a presidential veto of the law setting up 
the compact exists, establishment of a compact itself would rarely reveal 
any intent to harm nonparticipating states.  Indeed, there is some evidence 
that participating states have utilized compacts to shift costs to those states 
not included,189
To be sure, states may always lose in Congress.  On some issues, 
agrarian states may win, on others, it may be coal-producing states, and for 
still others, it may be states in which federal military bases are located.  The 
genius of the Virginia Plan
 although empirical evidence as to the incidence of cost 
shifting is extremely limited. 
190
After congressional delegation to a compact,
 was to minimize the potential that small 
states would lose out consistently in the legislative process.  Given the 
shifting coalitions, a state with an adverse interest today might become an 
ally tomorrow, and that possibility restrains larger states from encroaching 
too much on smaller or disfavored states’ interests.  Moreover, the need to 
present each proposed bill to the President also works to minimize the 
potential for states to exact too much benefit at the expense of others in the 
system.  The threat of a veto can squelch any such power play. 
191
 
 188. See, e.g., EnergySolutions, LLC v. Utah, 625 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2010) (involving 
an operator of a waste site resorting to the courts in an effort to permit waste from outside 
the compact states to be stored at the site). 
 however, there is no 
ongoing supervision by the President.  State officials need not comply with 
presidential circulars; nor are they subject to the President’s removal 
authority.  State compacts may well decide to visit the burdens of regulation 
on nonparticipating states.   
 189. See generally Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels and Congressional Consent, 68 
MO. L. REV. 285, 289 (2003).  Greve cites several examples, such as the Northeast Dairy 
Compact, 7 U.S.C. § 7526 (2006), to demonstrate the potential for state compacts to result in 
harm to nonparticipating states. See also Joseph J. Spengler, The Economic Limitations to 
Certain Uses of Interstate Compacts, 31 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 41, 42 (1937) (“[C]ontrol by 
compacting state may injure the inhabitants of non-compacting states.”).  Spengler uses the 
example of a compact designed to control production of cotton. Id. at 44.  Cotton-producing 
states would benefit, while those outside the compact whose citizens purchase cotton would 
have to pay more for the cotton. Id. 
 190. See THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 23–26 
(Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., int’l ed. 1920). 
 191. For a cynical summary of delegation in general, see DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER 
WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY:  HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 
(1993). 
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Contrast the delegation context to Congress’s role in a Dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge.  There, as well, Congress has the opportunity 
to ratify one state’s efforts to impose costs on businesses or citizens living 
outside its borders.192  As the Court summarized in Associated Industries of 
Missouri v. Lohman193 the Dormant Commerce Clause “prohibits economic 
protectionism . . . regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic 
interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.”194  The prospect of a 
presidential veto exists to temper any inclinations by members of Congress 
to sustain a discriminatory measure.195  Although a congressional override 
of a veto can enact a discriminatory measure into law,196
Yet, one critical distinction exists—in the Dormant Commerce Clause 
context, Congress directly assesses the benefits and drawbacks of the state 
law that allegedly burdens out of state interests.  In contrast, the potential 
burden or encroachment on disfavored states arises at a different stage in 
the delegation context—only after Congress and the President have agreed 
to the delegation.  The state compact’s action need not be channeled 
through Congress or the President before becoming law.  As with other 
delegations of administrative authority, there are political checks before the 
delegation, but not afterwards.  Just as legislation is subject to greater 
formal political checks than authority exercised by administrative agencies, 
so the protections for states are greater for legislation than for authority 
exercised by other states pursuant to a congressional delegation. 
 the requirement of 
presentment mutes that concern. 
The theoretical risk of encroachment among the states, however, does not 
suggest an easily enforceable line to draw.197
 
 192. See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648 (1981); 
Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du 
Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 542–43 (1949).  The only congressional constraints may be the 
Commerce Clause, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses. W. & S. Life 
Insurance, 451 U.S. at 655–56. 
  Tests would have to be 
forged, as under the Dormant Commerce Clause, to determine when states’ 
exercise of delegated authority, particularly through compacts, results in an 
unacceptable harm to an unrepresented state.  The contours of this newly 
devised subpart of the Nondelegation Doctrine would be difficult to derive.  
Courts presumably would consider whether to focus principally on the 
 193. 511 U.S. 641 (1994). 
 194. Id. at 647 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 195. Exploitation of nonparticipating states by those in compacts is so likely “that 
Congress is called in to review the arrangement at the outset.” Saul Levmore, Interstate 
Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 570 n.17 (1983). 
 196. As the Court stated in Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), “[i]t is well established 
that Congress may authorize the States to engage in regulation that the Commerce Clause 
would otherwise forbid.” Id. at 138. 
 197. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (“[W]e have 
almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of 
policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  For a discussion of the Tenth Amendment as underenforced, see Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).  For an argument that the 
Due Process Clause is also underenforced, see Harold J. Krent, The Supreme Court as an 
Enforcement Agency, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1149 (1998). 
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intent underlying the challenged measure or, rather, its results, whether a 
new hydroelectric plant or standard setting for coal production.  One of the 
problems of any test is that nonparticipating states always are injured if the 
participating states help themselves financially through the compact and, as 
a consequence, make their venues more attractive for business.  Courts 
would have to determine which measures aimed at advancing the economic 
wealth of participating states impermissibly target nonparticipating states 
and which reflect run of the mill efforts aimed toward economic 
development of the region. 
More problematically, there is no remedy to apply unless courts step into 
the shoes of the President to determine if the President would have 
approved the measure had he been afforded the opportunity to review the 
policy set by the compact.  In essence, courts would have to second-guess 
presidential policy in determining which state measures—pursuant to 
congressionally delegated authority—unconstitutionally burden interests of 
other states. 
But that very second-guessing of presidential policy would itself be 
problematic, for the President would have no direct way to review the 
judicial decision to determine whether to permit the delegation to stand.  In 
the Dormant Commerce Clause setting, by contrast, Congress can consent 
to state initiatives that burden interstate commerce.  In the delegation 
context, however, the President would not have the final say. 
Judicial enforcement itself, therefore, would intrude into Article II 
prerogatives.  Judges cannot effectively evaluate policies implemented by 
state entities pursuant to congressional delegations.  In short, courts can 
review states’ exercise of congressionally delegated authority to determine 
if the delegate’s action is ultra vires, but courts cannot realistically step into 
the shoes of the President and invalidate exercises of authority that impose 
costs on other states. 
Finally, the difficulty of reviewing the exercise of authority delegated to 
compacts reinforces the importance of the ex ante decision to approve the 
initial delegation or formation of a compact.  Congress and the President 
should be aware of the potential that states may exercise delegated authority 
in a way that disadvantages other states’ interests.  Moreover, that 
possibility may well prove reason for courts to construe the terms of 
congressional delegations to states narrowly.198
 
 198. Cf. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (construing delegation narrowly to 
avoid constitutional question). See also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 112 
(1976) (construing delegation to Civil Service Commission narrowly to limit power to 
exclude resident aliens from federal workforce). 
  Courts should be stinting 
when reviewing challenges to authority exercised by congressionally 
approved compacts given that the policy formulated after such delegations 
evades the presidential superintendence designed to ensure that states do 
not take advantage of others.  Such strict construction reflects an 
accommodation between the federalism and Article II principles underlying 
our Constitution. 
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CONCLUSION 
To date, discussion of Free Enterprise Fund has focused on its potential 
impact to rigidify structures of administrative agencies.  If the President 
must supervise administrative officials through the removal authority, then 
Congress cannot innovate as much in creating administrative entities that 
are outside the political influence of the President.  Justice Breyer’s dissent 
vividly illustrates the ramifications of the decision if applied outside the 
narrow setting of the PCAOB. 
The broader implications of the decision, however, ultimately may rest 
with constricted opportunities for Congress to delegate authority to state 
and private entities.  Congress typically leaves the President with no 
removal authority when delegating outside the federal government.  The 
logic of Free Enterprise Fund strongly suggests that Congress may not, 
consistent with Article II, delegate significant authority to private and state 
entities.  Although the decision does not elaborate on what constitutes 
“significant authority,” it imperils a wide range of structures permitting 
private and state entities to participate in shaping federal law, including the 
Federal Open Market Committee, self-regulated organizations that have 
received Congress’s imprimatur, and congressionally approved state 
compacts. 
Free Enterprise Fund should prompt reconsideration of authority 
delegated by Congress to private entities.  Executive branch oversight not 
only comports with Article II, but can protect private parties from 
overreaching.  Preventing Congress from delegating to private parties 
ensures that public authority will be implemented in a way that can be 
traced to the President.  In particular, Congress after Free Enterprise Fund 
may not be able to delegate decision-making authority to groups such as the 
National Academy of Sciences or enforcement authority to self-regulatory 
organizations unless there is sufficiently stringent oversight by Article II 
entities. 
In contrast to private actors, however, state actors in large part are 
politically accountable, and there is little risk of congressional 
aggrandizement from delegation to state entities.  State officials should be 
able to enforce federal law, Congress should be able to incorporate state law 
by reference, and state compacts should be able to fashion federal policy.  
Courts should intervene only when compacts or other state entities infringe 
upon a distinct presidential power under Article II, such as the power to 
supervise foreign affairs.  Thus, while delegations to private individuals and 
entities should be curtailed in light of the lack of presidential oversight, 
Free Enterprise Fund should leave untouched most delegations to state 
entities:  our federalist structure presupposes a limitation on the President’s 
Article II responsibility to superintend enforcement of delegated authority. 
 
